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STEMMING THE MODIFICATION OF CHILD-SUPPORT
ORDERS BY RESPONDING COURTS:
A PROPOSAL TO AMEND RURESA'S
ANTISUPERSESSION CLAUSE
Jane H. Gorham*
Before 1950, a custodial parent had no effective mechanism
to enforce a child-support order against a non-custodial parent
residing in another state.1 Child-support orders generally
were not accorded full faith and credit in foreign jurisdictions
because they were modifiable, and therefore were not final
judgments.2 Thus, even if the custodial parent were willing
and able to spend the time, money, and energy to bring suit in
the state in which the non-custodial parent resided, she3 could
not get relief. Consequently, a parent wishing to avoid child-
support obligations could escape the jurisdiction of the court
by moving.4 Not surprisingly, this caused great hardship to
custodial parents who counted on child-support payments to
support their children. In 1949, the estimated bill for public
assistance to families so deserted was $205 million.'
In 1950, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws promulgated, and the American Bar
Association approved, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
* Executive Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 24,
1991. B.A., Cornell University, 1988; J.D., University of Michigan Law School,
expected 1991. Thanks to Professor Carl Schneider and Dean Edward Cooper for
assisting in my preparations to write this Note. I am, of course, solely responsible
for the content of the Note and for any errors it may contain.
1. See W. BROCKELBANK & F. INFAUSTO, INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF FAMILY
SUPPORT 3-4 (2d ed. 1971).
2. Fox, The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 4 Fam. L. Rep.
(BNA) 4017, 4017 (May 2, 1978).
3. Although the practice of the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
is to use gender-neutral language, this Note will refer to the custodial parent as "she"
and the non-custodial parent as "he" where pronouns are necessary. This is done in
an effort at clarity, in recognition of a common scenario in which the mother is the
custodial parent and the father is the absent parent. Persons of either gender,
however, can and do become both custodial and absent parents under appropriate
circumstances. See, e.g., Byrd v. O'Neill, 309 Minn. 415, 244 N.W.2d 657 (1976)
(involving an absent mother).
4. Note, Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 20 WASHBURN L.J.
409, 410 (1981) (authored by Carl A. Gallagher).
5. UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT (URESA) prefatory note
to 1950 Act, 9B U.L.A. 556 (1987).
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Support Act (URESA),6 popularly known as the "Runaway
Pappy Act."7 URESA was amended in 1952, 1958, and
adopted in revised form in 1968.' The revised version made
substantial changes to URESA, 9 and in that form it is known
as the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(RURESA).' ° RURESA provides custodial parents with a
civil enforcement mechanism, 1 a civil registration proce-
dure, 12 and a criminal extradition procedure 3 so that they
can force a parent who has left the state to comply with
child-support orders. The Act 14 won widespread acceptance;
each of the fifty states and four territories has adopted it in
some form. 5
6. See id. historical note, 9B U.L.A. 553; see generally Elrod, Enforcing Child
Support Using the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, JUV. &
FAM. CT. J., Fall 1985, at 57; Fox, supra note 2.
7. Elrod, supra note 6, at 57.
8. REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT (RURESA)
historical note, 9B U.L.A. 382 (1987).
9. For a summary of these changes, see id. prefatory note, 9B U.L.A. 382-83.
10. Id., 9B U.L.A. 382.
11. See id. §§ 7-34, 9B U.L.A. 423-540.
12. See id. §§ 35-43, 9B U.L.A. 540-52.
13. See id. §§ 5-6, 9B U.L.A. 416-23.
14. I will refer to both URESA and RURESA as "the Act" when my argument
applies to both versions of the uniform law. When there is a reason to refer to a
particular version of the Act, I will refer to either URESA, RURESA, or an amended
version adopted by a particular state.
15. RURESA is in force in Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1651 to -1691
(1982 & Supp. 1990); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-14-101 to -806 (1991); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 1650-1699.4 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-5-101 to -144
(1987 & Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. §§ 88.011-.371 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-11-40
to -81 (1982 & Supp. 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 576-1 to -42 (1985 & Supp. 1990);
IDAHO CODE §§ 7-1048 to -1089 (1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 1201-1242
(1989); IOWA CODE §§ 252A.1-.25 (1985 & Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-451
to -491 (1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 407.010-.480 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 &
Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 13:1641-:1698 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 331-420 (1981 & Supp. 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 780.151-.183 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. §§ 518C.01-.36 (1982); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 40-5-101 to -142 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-762 to -7,104 (1988);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 130.010-.370 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 546:1-:41 (1974 &
Supp. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:4-30.24 to .64 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40-6-1 to -41 (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52A-1 to -32 (1984 & Supp. 1990); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 14-12.1-01 to -43 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3115.01-34
(Baldwin 1988 & Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, §§ 301-344 (Supp. 1990); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 110.005-.291 (1989); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 4501-4540 (Purdon 1990);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-11-1 to -42 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-960 to -1170 (Law.
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More recently, the federal government has stepped in and
required states to enact a variety of child-support enforcement
measures to improve collection rates.16 States have cooperat-
ed"v because they have a financial interest in collecting
child-support payments owed to welfare recipients.1" Many of
these measures have important interstate applications, which
have enhanced or replaced the Act as a means of enforcing
child-support orders against obligors residing in other jurisdic-
tions. 9 By bringing resources available only at the federal
level to bear upon this problem, as well as using financial
power to persuade and permit states to improve their enforce-
ment measures, the federal government has made significant
progress toward relieving the burden that unpaid child support
places on custodial parents and public-assistance programs.2 °
Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-9A-1 to -43 (1984); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 21.01-.66 (Vernon Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 385-428 (1989); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 20-88.12-.31 (1990); W. VA. CODE §§ 48A-7-1 to -41 (1986 & Supp.
1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.65(1)-(42) (West Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. §§ 20-4-101
to -138 (1987 & Supp. 1990); see also 9B U.L.A. 381 (table) (1987 & Supp. 1991).
URESA is in force in Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of
Columbia, Guam, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New
York, Puerto Rico, Tennessee, Utah, the Virgin Islands, and Washington. See ALA.
CODE §§ 30-4-80 to -98 (1989); ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.25.010-.270 (1983 & Supp. 1990);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-180 to -211 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, §§ 601-640 (1988); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-301 to -326 (1988); GUAM Civ.
PROC. CODE §§ 1500-1531 (1970); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-2-1-1 to -39 (West 1979 &
Supp. 1990); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 10-301 to -340 (1984 & Supp. 1990); MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 273A, §§ 1-17 (1988); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-11-1 to -71 (1972 & Supp. 1990);
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 454.010-.360 (1986 & Supp. 1990); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 30-43
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1991); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32, §§ 3311-3313bb (1990); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 36-5-201 to -229 (1984 & Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-31-1 to -39
(1990 & Supp. 1991); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 391-429 (1964); WASH. REV. ,CODE
§§ 26.21.010-.910 (1989); see also 9B U.L.A. 553 (table) (1987 & Supp. 1991).
16. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669 (1988). See generally New 'Family Support Act'
Aims to Redouble National Child Support Enforcement Efforts, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA)
1047 (Nov. 22, 1988); Dodson & Horowitz, Child Support Enforcement Amendments
of 1984: New Tools for Enforcement, 10 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3051 (Oct. 23, 1984).
17. See 12 OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS. ANN. REP. VOL. I, at 15 (1987) [hereinafter 12 OCSE REPORT].
18. See, e.g., Note, Congress Demands Stricter Child-Support Enforcement:
Florida Requires Major Reforms To Comply, 10 NOVA L.J. 1371, 1404 (1986)
(authored by Maureen Gallen); see also 12 OCSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 11.
Congress also has created financial incentives and disincentives to encourage such
cooperation. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part II.
20. The Office of Child Support Enforcement reported that in fiscal year 1987,
federal enforcement programs collected $3.9 billion of child support owed-a twenty
percent increase over the amount collected in 1986. 12 OCSE REPORT, supra note 17,
at 7. Almost $1.4 billion was for families receiving public assistance, while nearly
$2.6 billion was collected for nonwelfare families. Id. at 9. Since its inception, the
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The Act authorizes a court in the state where the obligated
parent has moved to assist in enforcing support obligations.
The court in the state where the custodial parent lives (the
initiating court) and the court in the state where the absent
parent resides (the responding court) cooperate in this
effort. 21 Since federal efforts began facilitating the enforce-
ment of existing child-support orders, the focus in cases
brought under the Act has shifted to the problems arising
when the second court enters an award for an amount
different from the original order. Courts and legislatures have
disagreed widely over whether the responding court has the
authority to enter an order for a different amount, and if so,
what impact that subsequent order has on the original order.
The usual result is two concurrent child-support orders, each
with presumptive validity.22
This Note examines the practice of using the Act to modify
existing child-support orders. Part I explores the question of
whether the Act's enforcement mechanisms were designed to
permit the responding court to modify existing support orders.
It emphasizes the problems involved with concurrent support
orders and modification and describes the range of positions
courts have taken to support or oppose allowing responding
courts to modify support orders. Part II explores the federal
child-support enforcement programs, their interstate applica-
tions, and their relationship to the Act's enforcement mecha-
nisms. The analysis in these parts leads to Part III, which
proposes an amendment to the Act to clarify its function. This
amendment encourages use of the civil registration procedure
where there is a prior support order to avoid inconsistent
support orders. It also restricts the ability of responding
courts in civil enforcement actions to enter orders for amounts
that differ from the original order to prevent the problems of
concurrent support orders. This Part of the Note also points
out alternative means, such as long-arm statutes and the
automatic periodic review of child-support orders by the
entering court, that might be utilized more fruitfully to modify
support orders.
child-support program had collected over $23 billion. Id. at 7. See generally id. at
7-17 (showing the progress of the program from 1983 to 1987).
21. For an explanation of the genesis of the two-state suit, see W. BROCKELBANK
& F. INFAUSTO, supra note 1, at 4.
22. See infra Part I.
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I. THE UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT
OF SUPPORT ACT
A. The Mechanics of the Act
The drafters viewed URESA as a supplementary measure to
enforce child-support orders that were otherwise unenforceable
because the obligated parent had left the jurisdiction of the
court that entered the order.23 The civil enforcement mecha-
nism calls for a cooperative effort between two states. The
custodial parent seeking support ("obligee")24 files a petition
in the jurisdiction where she resides; 25 the court there is
called the "initiating court."26  Ultimately a child-support
order may be entered 27 in the jurisdiction where the non-
custodial parent owing support ("obligor")2' resides; the court
there is known as the "responding court."29 After a prelimi-
nary finding that a support obligation probably is unfulfilled,
the initiating court forwards the petition to the responding
court.3" In the proceedings that follow, the obligee is repre-
sented by the prosecuting attorney;3' she need not appear in
person.2  The hearing is generally limited to the issue of
support, excluding issues such as property settlements, visita-
tion and custody, or divorce. If the court finds a duty of
support arising from statutory, contractual, or common-law
obligations,34 the responding court may enter a support order
23. URESA prefatory note to 1950 Act, 9B U.L.A. 556 (1987).
24. RURESA § 2(f), 9B U.L.A. 402 (1987).
25. Id. § 11(b), 9B U.L.A. 440.
26. Id. § 14, 9B U.L.A. 450.
27. Id. § 24, 9B U.L.A. 487-88.
28. Id. § 2(g), 9B U.L.A. 402.
29. Id. § 2(l), 9B U.L.A. 403.
30. Id. § 14, 9B U.L.A. 450.
31. RURESA § 18(b), 9B U.L.A. 461 (1987); see also W. BROCKELBANK & F.
INFAUSTO, supra note 1, at 52.
32. The Act clearly contemplates that in most cases the obligee will not be
present and that her case will be based exclusively on her petition because it provides
that, in certain situations, a continuance may be granted to obtain additional
information from her. RURESA § 20, 9B U.L.A. 469 (1987).
33. This is a question of the court's jurisdiction. Many states explicitly deny the
responding court jurisdiction to do more than enforce a support order. See, e.g.,
ALAsKA STAT. § 25.25.250 (Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-11-42(11) (Supp. 1990);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 296(k)(5) (1989); NEV. REV. STAT § 130.290 (1990).
34. See RURESA § 2(b), (e), 9B U.L.A. 402 (1987).
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that it then has the authority to enforce.35 The responding
court can use any available enforcement measure to collect the
child support owed, including liens,36 contempt charges, and
bonding procedures. 7
In contrast with the civil enforcement procedure, which
directs the responding court to enter a new child-support
order, the civil registration procedure allows the obligee to
forward a copy of the original order to the responding court for
registration.38 The responding court treats the order as if it
were entered by the responding court and can use any
available measures to enforce it. 39 The registered support
order is enforced as a foreign money judgment, ° thus limit-
ing the available defenses to those directed at the order's
validity rather than its substantive terms.4'
These provisions thus ensure that interstate enforcement is
possible both in those cases in which a valid order exists and
in those in which no valid order yet exists. The Act's registra-
tion procedure may be a less confusing means of achieving
interstate enforcement when a court has previously entered a
support order covering these parties because there is no
opportunity for modification until after the order has been
registered.
B. The Debate Over Conforming Responding
Court Orders to Existing Orders
The modification controversy originates in the language of
the Act's antisupersession clause. The URESA antisuperses-
sion clause states that "[n]o order of support issued by a court
of this state when acting as a responding state shall supersede
any other order of support."42 The RURESA antisupersession
clause states that "[a] support order made by a court of this
State pursuant to this Act does not nullify ... a support order
35. Id. § 24, 9B U.L.A. 487-88.
36. See id., 9B U.L.A. 487 ("If the responding court finds a duty of support it may
. . subject the property of the obligor to the order.").
37. Id. § 26, 9B U.L.A. 520.
38. Id. § 39, 9B U.L.A. 543-44.
39. Id. § 40(a), 9B U.L.A. 546.
40. Id. § 40(c), 9B U.L.A. 546.
41. See W. BROCKELBANK & F. INFAUSTO, supra note 1, at 83.
42. URESA § 30, 9B U.L.A. 600 (1987).
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made by a court of any other state ... unless otherwise
specifically provided by the court."43 These provisions imply
that use of the enforcement measure is appropriate even when
there is a preexisting support order. It is unclear, however,
whether the court may enter an award for an amount that
differs from the prior award. The thrust of the controversy is
thus whether the responding court is free to enter an order for
an amount different from the amount in the previous order.44
Other language in the Act indicates that the drafters did not
expect responding courts to order amounts different from
amounts in preexisting support orders. The prefatory note to
the 1950 version of URESA states that the drafters intended
to supplement enforcement rather than create new duties:
The 1950 act attempted to improve and extend by
reciprocal legislation the enforcement of duties of support
through both the criminal and the civil law. Its provisions
are in addition to remedies now existing for the enforce-
ment of duties of support within the state .... [T]he new
act is meant to improve enforcement where the parties are
in different states.45
This statement of intent is echoed and reinforced in the
prefatory note to RURESA:
The Act itself creates no duties of family support but
leaves this to the legislatures of the several states. The
Act is concerned solely with the enforcement of the already
existing duties when the person to whom the duty is owed
is in one state and the person owing the duty is in another
state ......
These excerpts indicate that the authors of the Act intended
to create an effective mechanism to enforce child-support
43. RURESA § 31, 9B U.L.A. 531 (1987).
44. This problem arises in cases in which the obligee asks the court to enter an
order for "fair" or 'reasonable" child support instead of asking for the same amount
as the prior order, see, e.g., Wornkey v. Wornkey, 12 Kan. App. 2d 506, 509, 749 P.2d
1045, 1048 (1988); Olson v. Olson, 534 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976), as well
as in those in which one of the parents asks the court to modify an existing
child-support award because of changed circumstances, see, e.g., Commonwealth ex
rel. Ball v. Musiak, 775 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).
45. URESA prefatory note to 1950 Act, 9B U.L.A. 556 (1987) (emphasis added).
46. RURESA prefatory note, 9B U.L.A. 382 (1987) (emphasis added).
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orders between parties living in different states. They also
indicate that the drafters did not intend to create any new
support obligations under the Act.
But most courts addressing the issue have concluded that
the responding court is entitled to enter a support order for an
amount different from that in any previous order." These
courts usually assert that they are exercising independent
jurisdiction over the new support order and are therefore
empowered to make their own assessment of the circumstances
relevant to the appropriate amount of child support.4" This
independent assessment often will lead the responding court
to enter a support order for an amount different from the
original support order.49 This is particularly true when only
the obligor appears before the court in person.5" In addition,
state laws on how child-support obligations are to be calculat-
ed differ widely,51 so that if a responding court is to make a
calculation of child support based solely on the law of its
jurisdiction it is likely to differ in amount from a child-support
order entered by a court in another state.52
47. See, e.g., Ainbender v. Ainbender, 344 A.2d 263, 265 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975);
DeFeo v. DeFeo, 428 A.2d 26, 28 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1981); Koon v. Boulder County, Dep't
of Social Servs., 494 So. 2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. 1986); State v. McKenna, 253 Ga. 6, 8,
315 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1984); see also Reitmayer, Modification of Divorce Support
Decrees Under RURESA: A Procedural and Substantive Quagmire, 20 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 425, 432 (1984-85); Annotation, Construction and Effect of Provision of Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act that No Support Order Shall Supersede or
Nullify Any Other Order, 31 A.L.R.4th 347, 362 (1984) ("[Tlhe majority of cases
construing the antisupersession provision of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act have taken the view that the provision does not prevent a responding
court from entering a valid child support order effective prospectively which is
different from the order entered by the divorce court or by any previous court . . .
48. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 366 N.W.2d 845, 848 (S.D. 1985).
49. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gifford, 152 Ill. App. 3d 422, 424-26, 504 N.E.2d
812, 814 (1987), affd in part and rev'd in part, 122 Ill. 2d 34, 521 N.E.2d 929 (1988);
Ibach v. Ibach, 123 Ariz. 507, 508, 600 P.2d 1370, 1371 (1979).
50. One author lists "a tendency for judges in the obligor's state to favor the
obligor because he is the only one physically present in court" as a drawback of the
Act. Elrod, supra note 6, at 57.
51. For surveys of various state guidelines for calculating child-support orders,
see Brackney, Battling Inconsistency and Inadequacy: Child Support Guidelines in
the States, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 197 (1988); Goldfarb, What Every Lawyer Should
Know About Child Support Guidelines, 13 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3031 (Sept. 29, 1987);
Williams, Child Support Guidelines: Economic Basis and Analysis of Alternative
Approaches in 1 IMPROVING CHILD SUPPORT PRACTICE pt. 1, at 1 (1986) (published by
the American Bar Association).
52. For example, in Gifford, an Illinois divorce court ordered the obligor to pay
a percentage of his income, but the responding court in Michigan ordered an amount
based on the child's needs and both parents' incomes. 152 Ill. App. 3d at 424-26, 504
N.E.2d at 813-14. For an argument that failure to allow a father's obligation to
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In the abstract, it seems that a court exercising independent
jurisdiction is entitled to assess independently the appropriate
amount of child support owed, regardless of the amount
entered in a previous support order. The Act's civil enforce-
ment mechanism requires the court to hold a hearing 3 and
enter a child-support order based on its findings.54 But in
the registration procedure the only defenses are those which
could be raised against a foreign money judgment.55 This
distinction is important because the civil enforcement mecha-
nism inherently seems to call for a de novo review of the
circumstances and application of law by the responding court.
But the majority position, allowing responding courts to
enter new support orders of different amounts, is not followed
unanimously.5  For example, the Nevada Supreme Court
held in Taylor v. Vilcheck 7 that the amount of the respond-
ing court's new order may never be higher than the amount of
the original order.5" It also held that a responding court may
only lower the amount owed if the obligor demonstrates an
inability to pay,59 and on the understanding that this relief
will be only temporary. 6° The court based its holding on an
amendment to Nevada's version of RURESA which empha-
sized that an order by a responding court could never modify
or supersede an earlier child-support order.61 On the other
hand, when North Dakota's high court held that a responding
court could not enter an order for an amount different from
the original,62 the North Dakota legislature amended its law
to provide specifically for the entry of orders of differing amounts.'
diminish if he moves to another state with lower support obligations violates his right
to travel, see W. BROCKELBANK & F. INFAUSTO, supra note 1, at 35.
53. See RURESA §§ 20-23, 9B U.L.A. 469-84 (1987) (delineating rules of
procedure and rules of evidence for hearings).
54. See id. § 24, 9B U.L.A. 487-88 (outlining requirements for support orders).
55. RURESA § 40(c), 9B U.L.A. 546 (1987).
56. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Ball v. Musiak, 775 S.W.2d 524, 526 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1989); Bushway v. Riendeau, 137 Vt. 455, 464, 407 A.2d 178, 182 (1979).
57. 103 Nev. 462, 745 P.2d 702 (1987).
58. Id. at 471, 745 P.2d at 708.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 470, 745 P.2d at 708 (stating that a responding court can enter a lower
amount "where an obligor demonstrates to the responding court that 'good cause'
exists for a temporary reduction in the amount of support payments due under a
prior decree").
61. Id. at 464, 745 P.2d at 704 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 130.280 (1987)).
62. See Craft v. Hertz, 182 N.W.2d 293, 297 (N.D. 1970) ("[Tlhe responding state
has no alternative but to find a duty of the obligor to furnish support in the amount
provided by the foreign decree.").
63. Act approved Mar. 7, 1979, House Bill No. 1184, 1979 N.D. Laws ch. 197, § 2
(codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-12.1-24 (1981)); see also Coogan v. Fennell, 379
N.W.2d 791, 794-95 (N.D. 1985) (discussing the legislative response to Craft).
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C. The Problem of Concurrent Child-Support Orders
Assuming, arguendo, that a responding court is permitted
to make an independent assessment and enter a support order
for a different amount, the second issue to resolve is what
effect that new order has on orders previously entered by
other courts. Much of the current debate about the Act
focuses on this issue, and courts and legislatures have
disagreed widely as to how to resolve it. 64 Consequently,
current law on modification and the antisupersession clause
is unclear, inconsistent, and confusing.
Although some courts, following the text of RURESA, have
held that a responding court can modify a prior order if it does
so expressly,"5 many courts have held that a responding
court's order has no effect on previous orders entered by courts
in other states.66 For example, in Thompson v. Thompson,"
a Wyoming divorce court ordered a father to pay $400 per
month in child support.6" Several years later, upon becoming
unemployed, the father moved to South Dakota to live with his
parents. He then unilaterally reduced the amount of child
support he paid. The mother used RURESA to have the Wyo-
ming order enforced in South Dakota. The father asked the
court to modify the order, based on his changed circum-
stances.69 On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota
granted his request, but noted that "[s]uch an order does not
modify the out-of-state support order and is prospective in
effect only."7" This holding means that the two child-support
orders for different amounts will exist simultaneously; each of
64. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 130.280 (1987) (providing that order of
responding court can never modify or supersede a prior order) and Taylor v. Vilcheck,
103 Nev. 462, 470-72, 745 P.2d 702, 708-09 (1987) (discussing § 130.280) with Ibach
v. Ibach, 123 Ariz. 507, 509-11, 600 P.2d 1370, 1372-74 (1979) (holding that second
order modifies prior order) and State ex rel. Louisiana v. Phillips, 39 Or. App. 325,
327, 591 P.2d 1196, 1197 (1979) (same).
65. See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., State v. McKenna, 253 Ga. 6, 9, 315 S.E.2d 885, 887 (1984);
Thompson v. Thompson, 366 N.W.2d 845, 847 (S.D. 1985).
67. 366 N.W.2d 845 (S.D. 1985).
68. Id. at 846.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 848.
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them will be valid in at least one jurisdiction. In essence,
these are concurrent support orders.
Without modification, the status of both the new and the old
support orders is unclear. Although the Act provides that
payments under one order will be credited against both,71
arrearages will presumably accumulate in the jurisdiction
where the higher order was entered if the obligor only pays
the lower amount.72 Some courts thus have allowed obligees
to recover the difference between the two orders in later ac-
tions.73 This can only confuse the obligor as to the extent of
his obligation and make risky his reliance on the payments he
already has made in one state. The accumulation of arrear-
ages alone also can trigger automatic wage withholding, con-
tempt charges, and other enforcement mechanisms that are
detrimental to the obligor,74 so it is crucial that the obligor
be able to determine the precise amount of his obligation.75
71. RURESA § 31, 9B U.L.A. 531 (1987).
72. In Taylor v. Vilcheck, 103 Nev. 462, 745 P.2d 702 (1987), the Supreme Court
of Nevada stated that while the responding court could enter an order for less than
the original order, the full amount of support ordered by a Kentucky court would
'continue to accumulate under that prior order, and appellant [could] seek
enforcement of any arrearages due under the Kentucky decree, subject to a credit for
any payments made pursuant to the Nevada RURESA order, in an appropriate civil
action." Id. at 466, 745 P.2d at 705.
73. See, e.g., Britton v. Floyd, 293 Ark. 397, 400, 738 S.W.2d 408, 410 (1987);
Kammerman v. Kammerman, 543 A.2d 794, 795-96, 802 (D.C. 1988). Usually, the
responding court will enforce the new order, while the court that granted the divorce
or entered the original order is likely to enforce the earlier order. For example, in
Britton, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that compliance with a Kansas URESA
order which lowered the amount of support due did not prevent arrearages under the
original Arkansas support order from accumulating or being enforced because the
URESA order could not modify or nullify the original order. 293 Ark. at 400, 738
S.W.2d at 410. And in Kammerman, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held
that compliance with a Maryland divorce decree was not a defense to the enforcement
of a District of Columbia URESA support order. 543 A.2d at 794-95; cf. Henry v.
Knight, 746 P.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that although
arrearages under the original Massachusetts divorce order did accrue, Colorado only
could enforce arrearages under the Colorado URESA order).
74. For example, in Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P.2d 213 (Wyo. 1985), the court
garnished the obligor's wages because of accumulated arrearages, despite his compli-
ance with the modified order. Id. at 215. For a discussion of these enforcement
mechanisms, see infra notes 116-28.
75. One obligor argued that courts should allow modification only by the
rendering jurisdiction "because otherwise there [would] be multiple and perhaps
inconsistent orders enforceable against him." Straek v. Straek, 156 Cal. App. 3d 617,
625, 203 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72 (1984). The court answered, "While sympathetic to an
obligor placed in this dilemma, our reply is that RURESA contemplates and allows
this result." Id.
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If the obligor does not comply with either order, the exis-
tence of two concurrent support orders can further complicate
matters. Courts attempting to enforce the support obligation
in any type of later action (under the Act or otherwise) will be
forced to choose either one of the prior amounts or an entirely
new one. There does not seem to be a principled way to
choose if the later order does not nullify the prior order,
leaving the prior order enforceable. In addition, under federal
legislation, initial child-support orders must be entered under
procedures entitling them to full faith and credit.16 Because
both concurrent support orders are presumptively valid,77 it
is difficult to see how the second order can be entered. Al-
though some courts have enforced the responding court's order
under these circumstances, 8 other courts have refused to
grant full faith and credit to these orders.79 In one case, a
federal district court held that the larger of the two orders will
be enforced."
The antisupersession clauses of URESA and RURESA are
consistent with the Act's role as a supplementary enforcement
mechanism. But concurrent child-support orders are an
inevitable result given the way some state courts interpret
these clauses. Until the issue of concurrent child-support
orders is resolved, obligors will never know the true extent of
their child-support obligations, and the treatment of the issue
will continue to depend on which state happens to have
jurisdiction when obligees seek enforcement under the Act.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9) (1988).
77. Ainbender v. Ainbender, 344 A.2d 263, 265 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975).
78. See, e.g., id.
79. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Wettstein, 160 Ill. App. 3d 554, 560, 514 N.E.2d
783, 786 (1987); In re Marriage of Gifford, 152 Ill. App. 3d 422, 431, 504 N.E.2d 812,
818 (1987); Poirrier v. Jones, 781 P.2d 531, 532 (Wyo. 1989).
80. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that:
The power of a third court to enforce the original child support order appears,
at first blush, to conflict with the power of a state court, responding to a
URESA petition, to modify the original order. Because the Texas URESA
statute, § 21.43, provides for crediting amounts paid under one order to
amounts due under the other, the order providing the higher amounts of
support payments will always take precedence, and therefore a URESA
reduction of support will be rendered void by enforcement of the original order.
Sheres v. Engelman, 534 F. Supp. 286, 293 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
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D. The Problem of Modification
Some courts, following the text of RURESA, have held that
courts can modify previous orders if they do so expressly."1
For example, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that a court
can modify a support order, but not without notice to protect
the obligee's due process rights.8 2 Courts in Arizona 3 and
Oregon 4 also have held that a second order modifies a prior
order. The Oregon position was based upon a statutory
provision stating that petitioners consent to the court's power
to modify the obligation by filing a petition," while the Arizo-
na court held that the obligee's petition itself gave the
responding court the authority to modify the prior order.8 6
This position seems to solve the problem of concurrent
support orders, but it raises significant problems of its own.
The responding court generally has only the obligor before it
in person, and its authority is usually limited to the question
of support, excluding such other important issues as custody,
visitation, and alimony. 7 Although the obligee is legally
represented, that representation usually is by an attorney who
has never met with her and who has only a limited amount of
information about her case. 8 If a court modifies a child-
support order without notifying the obligee, it raises questions
of due process. 9 In addition, the procedure is abbreviated
81. See, e.g., People ex rel. Oetjen v. Oetjen, 92 Ill. App. 3d 699, 703, 416 N.E.2d
278, 281 (1980); Wornkey v. Wornkey, 12 Kan. App. 2d 506, 512, 749 P.2d 1045, 1050
(1988); Coogan v. Fennell, 379 N.W.2d 791, 795-96 (N.D. 1985); Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710
P.2d 213, 216 (Wyo. 1985).
82. Bjugan, 710 P.2d at 220. Modification of a support order affects a property
right, and therefore the court must comply with due process requirements. Id. at
219.
83. Ibach v. Ibach, 123 Ariz. 507, 511, 600 P.2d 1370, 1374 (1979).
84. State ex rel. Louisiana v. Phillips, 39 Or. App. 325, 327, 591 P.2d 1196, 1197
(1979) (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 110.175 (repealed 1979)).
85. OR. REV. STAT. § 110. 175 (1975) (repealed 1979). See also Note, supra note
4, at 419.
86. Ibach, 123 Ariz. at 511, 600 P.2d at 1374. The court found that "[w]hile the
Colorado court may not have specifically announced that it intended to modify the
Arizona support order, the issue of whether to enforce it or to modify it was before
the court. The Colorado court, by ordering [the obligor] to pay $75.00 per month,
obviously intended to modify the Arizona support decree." Id.
87. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P.2d 213, 219-20 (Wyo. 1985); see also
Reitmayer, supra note 47, at 432.
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and may limit the parties' abilities to present their cases.90
This process is not equitable, appropriate, or well suited to
evaluating changed circumstances or overruling prior orders
made in more thorough proceedings. As one court stated, "It
is difficult to see how a prosecuting attorney acting on behalf
of an absent obligee can fulfill his or her mandate to litigate
such a case diligently under these circumstances."91 Making
a final determination of the amount of child support owed in
these circumstances is a troubling proposition.92 Moreover,
allowing the responding court to modify the order would deter
deserving obligees from taking advantage of this enforcement
mechanism, designed expressly for them, for fear of having the
order permanently lowered or eliminated without their
presence or participation.
Modification of a support order in a court that does not have
personal jurisdiction over the obligee also may present
constitutional jurisdiction problems.9" Although some have
argued that the obligee consents to the court's jurisdiction by
calling upon it to enforce the order,94 one can just as easily
contend that she really only calls upon the court in the initiat-
ing jurisdiction for enforcement assistance. She usually has
never been present in the responding court; the district
attorney (or his equivalent) has brought suit on her behalf.
This is quite different from the case where the obligee herself
has come to the court or has asked the court to modify the
child-support award. The Supreme Court created protection
90. As one author has argued:
[I]f the obligee is seeking an increase in support over a prior divorce support
order, . . . it is questionable whether the obligor can present a defense to
increased support in the absence of the ability to cross-examine the obligee and
in the absence of the ability to examine any of the obligee's documentary
evidence. Conversely, if the obligor is seeking a reduction in the amount of
support contained in a prior support decree, it is questionable whether the
obligee can rebut the case for reduction if she/he is not present at the hearing
and has no advance knowledge that a request for reduction will be made by the
obligor.
Reitmayer, supra note 47, at 432-33.
91. Taylor v. Vilcheck, 103 Nev. 462, 471-72, 745 P.2d 702, 709 (1987).
92. This point led an Illinois court to deny full faith and credit to an order
entered by a Michigan court in a RURESA action. The Michigan court had ordered
a reduction in support owed without hearing direct testimony from the obligee. In
re Marriage of Gifford, 152 Ill. App. 3d 422, 431, 504 N.E.2d 812, 818 (1987).
93. See Reitmayer, supra note 47, at 435-38; Note, supra note 4, at 420-21.
94. See, e.g., State ex rel. Louisiana v. Phillips, 39 Or. App. 325, 328, 591 P.2d
1196, 1197 (1979).
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for absent fathers when it held in Kulko v. Superior Court5
that a father allowing his daughter to live in California with
her mother did not give the state jurisdiction over the father
for child-support matters.96 Granting the responding court
jurisdiction over the mother to modify the award based solely
upon the fact that the father lives within that court's jurisdic-
tion raises similar concerns, at least in terms of equity and
fairness. The Court's opinion in Kulko implicitly recognizes
that the family law area presents unique constitutional
jurisdiction problems.97 Resolution of such problems must
take into account the nature of familial relations and their
associated special rights and privileges.
Even when the court purports to nullify the prior support
order, at present it is unclear whether that modification will
be recognized elsewhere. The confusion and disagreement
surrounding this issue has led to such varied interpretations
by courts that it is difficult to predict how other courts will
react to the modification. In this sense the Act has ceased to
be a truly uniform act.
II. THE FEDERAL CHILD-SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM
When URESA was created, it was the only option available
for enforcing child-support orders when the obligated parent
crossed a state line.9" But there has been an increasing
awareness of the difficulties involved in effectively enforcing
child-support orders, and other options have been introduced.
Most prominent among these programs is Title IV-D of the
Social Security Act, the Federal Child Support Enforcement
Act (Title IV-D), 99 which currently provides several different
95. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
96. Id. at 97-98.
97. The majority wrote:
To make jurisdiction in a case such as this turn on whether appellant bought
his daughter her ticket or instead unsuccessfully sought to prevent her
departure would impose an unreasonable burden on family relations, and one
wholly unjustified by the "quality and nature" of appellant's activities in or
relating to the State of California.
Id. at 98 (emphasis added) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 319 (1945)); see also Lewis, A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction:
Flexible Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1, 51 (1984).
98. See W. BROCKELBANK, INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF FAMILY SUPPORT, at v
(1st ed. 1960) (stating that the "[Aict filled a real social and economic need").
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-687 (1988). Congress added Title IV to the Social Security
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kinds of mechanisms designed to facilitate the interstate
enforcement of child-support orders.1 °° Title IV-D was origi-
nally prompted by concerns about the rising cost of the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Program-costs
attributable in large part to the growing number of children
who were not receiving the full support they were entitled to
from absent parents (as opposed to those children who were
orphaned).10' Although fiscally motivated, Congress also
recognized a general consensus which the government must
promote: parents have an absolute obligation to support their
children. Legislators created these serious mechanisms for the
enforcement of child-support obligations as a way of strength-
ening family values.10 2
Title IV-D requires states to implement a number of child-
support enforcement programs under the threat of a reduction
in federal funding for AFDC and unemployment compensation
if a state does not cooperate. 10 3 It provides funding for these
programs,1 4 and it also provides additional incentive pay-
ments to those states that run their programs efficiently.0 5
The federal program first requires each state to establish
Title IV-D agency offices to assist parents who need to obtain
Act in 1974. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88
Stat. 2337, 2351-58 (1975).
100. See generally Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsi-
bility and the Public Interest, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 367, 372-77.
101. NATIONAL INST. FOR CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, OFFICE OF CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ESSENTIALS FOR
ATTORNEYS IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, at xix, xxi (1986) [hereinafter CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT]; Note, A Review of the Child Support Enforcement Program,
20 J. FAM. L. 489, 490-92 (1981-82) (authored by Steven M. Fleece).
102. A Senate Finance Committee report on this legislation states:
The Committee believes that all children have the right to receive support
from their fathers. The Committee bill ... is designed to help children attain
this right, including the right to have their fathers identified so that support
can be obtained. The immediate result will be a lower welfare cost to the
taxpayer but, more importantly, as an effective support collection system is
established fathers will be deterred from deserting their families to welfare
and children will be spared the effects of family breakup.
S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 42 (1974); see also Baker & Stuff, The Costs
and Benefits of Child Support Enforcement, Juv. & FAM. CT. J., Winter 1983-84, at
41 (quoting the report). But cf. Child Support Enforcement Legislation Approved by
House, Sent to President, 10 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1551 (Aug. 14, 1984) (reporting that
the rapid progress of the bill was because of the concern over the "feminization" of
poverty).
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 603(h) (1988) (relating to AFDC); id. § 503(e)(3) (relating to
unemployment compensation).
104. Id. § 655.
105. Id. § 658.
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or enforce child-support orders.10 6  Title IV-D specifically
states that this assistance must be available to all parents, not
only those who receive AFDC or other public assistance.0 7
The Title IV-D agency office centralizes and facilitates enforce-
ment efforts for AFDC recipients and other parents who
request enforcement services and thereby ensures that legal
assistance as well as information regarding the various
options available for enforcing child-support orders is available
to everyone.08 This can be especially helpful in the inter-
state context. An obligee can contact the Title IV-D office in
her own state to initiate enforcement against an obligor
residing in another state. She also knows that an equivalent
office in the foreign state will handle her request.
Another important feature of the federal program, useful to
anyone wishing to enforce a child-support order, regardless of
which enforcement mechanism is chosen, is the parent locator
service. Title IV-D created a federal parent locator service0 9
and directed states to establish similar state services.1 By
placing the vast information resources of the government at
their disposal, these services help parents seeking enforcement
of child-support orders to find the obligated absent parent.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) can
search the records of all federal agencies and departments on
behalf of parents.1 HHS can then pass along information
which does not endanger national security to parents who are
attempting to enforce child-support orders.1 2  HHS can
obtain current addresses, employment data, and other
information by searching the records of the Social Security
Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, the Department
of Labor, the Armed Services, the Department of Veterans'
Affairs, and other government agencies. 113 Title IV-D also
requires states to set up similar programs on the state level
and to handle requests from parents who wish to use the
106. Id. § 654(3).
107. Id. § 654(6)(n); see also Dodson & Horowitz, supra note 16, at 3057.
108. Dodson & Horowitz, supra note 16, at 3057.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1988).
110. Id. § 654(8).
111. Id. § 653(e).
112. Id. § 653(b), (c).
113. See id. § 653(e).
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federal service.114 This type of program can help parents get
over the first and often largest hurdle encountered in child-
support enforcement: finding the obligor.
115
Title IV-D further requires that states enact certain effective
enforcement measures. These measures include automatic
wage withholding," 6  liens," 7  bonding,"8  state income
tax refund intercepts," 9 and provisions for establishing
paternity, 20 in addition to programs that function on the
national level, such as federal income tax refund inter-
cepts' 2' and garnishment of wages, pensions, and benefits of
federal employees 122 and members of the armed services. 2 '
Title IV-D also requires states to cooperate in enforcing
sister-state support orders.'24 For example, income with-
holding must be available for all income earned by an obligor
within the state, regardless of the domicile of the child or the
custodial parent. 25 To encourage states to cooperate in this
matter, the money collected by the state on behalf of an
obligee in another state is included in the total funds collected
by the state. 26 This figure is then used to determine wheth-
er a state deserves an incentive payment.'27 The application
of these enforcement measures to interstate enforcement cases
means that the more unwieldy URESA and RURESA proce-
dures will be unnecessary in many situations.
28
114. Id. § 654(8).
115. See R. HOROWITZ & H. DAVIDSON, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 31 (1984) ("In
many cases the absent parent's whereabouts are unknown; often the absent parent
disappears and must be located before support enforcement can begin.").
116. 42 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1988).
117. Id. § 666(a)(4).
118. Id. § 666(a)(6).
119. Id. § 666(a)(3).
120. Id. § 666(a)(5).
121. Id. § 664.
122. Id. § 661.
123. Id. § 665.
124. Id. § 654(9)(c).
125. Id. § 666(b)(9).
126. Id. § 658(d).
127. Id.; see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
128. For example, the Florida version of the Act contains the following provision
on legislative intent:
Common-law and statutory procedures governing the remedies for the
establishment and enforcement of orders of support for children by responsible
parents under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act have not
proven sufficiently effective or efficient to cope with the increasing incidence of
establishing and collecting child-support obligations when the petitioner and
respondent reside in different states. The state, therefore, exercising its police
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III. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
The Act, in granting responding courts the ability to enter
an independent order, was designed to provide a supplementa-
ry means of enforcing child-support obligations that would not
otherwise be enforceable. It was never intended to allow
courts to create child-support obligations, but only to enforce
existing ones.12 9 The difficulties courts encounter when
attempting to use the Act to modify child-support orders arise
simply because the Act was not intended to be a tool for
modification.
It therefore makes sense to require that parents who want
to modify child-support orders do so in a court that has
jurisdiction over all pertinent issues and parties. Incentives
already built into the situation will encourage the parties to
litigate and settle modification problems rather than avoid
compliance. Obligees who want the amount of child support
increased have financial interests in litigating this question,
and obligors, rather than risk sanctions, will bring suit to
lower the amount if they become unable to pay. But this kind
of litigation should proceed only in courts having both of the
parties before them and hearing all of the facts. The Act is
not designed to accomplish this.
One way to resolve this problem is to ensure that at least
one court will have jurisdiction over both parties at any one
time. One author has suggested increasing the use of narrow-
ly tailored long-arm statutes to bring the obligor to the
jurisdiction where the obligee resides.13 ° This suggested
solution would bring both parties together before a court that
had jurisdiction over the entire matter, while saving the
obligee the expense and effort of taking the obligor to court in
and sovereign powers, declares that the common-law and statutory remedies
pertaining to family desertion and nonsupport of dependent children shall be
augmented by the additional remedies directed to the resources of the
responsible parents as mandated by the Florida IV-D program .... In order
to render resources more immediately available to satisfy child-support orders,
it is the legislative intent that the remedies provided herein shall be in addition
to, and not in lieu of, existing remedies.
FLA. STAT. § 88.012 (1989).
129. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
130. See Reitmayer, supra note 47, at 441-44.
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his home state. But there may be jurisdictional difficulties
with this solution when the obligee resides in a state with
which the obligor has no contacts.'31 A number of states
now grant the court in which the divorce or child-support issue
was originally litigated continuing jurisdiction over all matters
related to it.' 32 This solution may not always be convenient
for the parties, particularly if the obligee has moved away, but
it makes sense to provide the court in which the divorce or
child-support issue was originally litigated with the long-arm
power to resolve effectively modification controversies.
Some other options would be to require that child-support
orders, unlike traditional fixed amount orders, be reviewed
periodically or that they be tied more closely to the parents'
circumstances. Periodic review would provide an opportunity
for modification before the need for litigation arose.'33
Child-support awards tied to circumstances such as the
father's salary also would help alleviate these difficulties by
reflecting present reality rather than the circumstances at the
time of the divorce.'34 Modification usually is sought by the
father who wishes to have his obligation reduced because of a
severe loss of income or unemployment, 3 ' or by the mother
131. See Kulko v. Superior Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 91-96 (1978) (holding that California
could not assert jurisdiction over a father merely because he permitted his daughter
to live in the state); see also Note, Virginia's Domestic Relations Long-Arm Legisla-
tion: Does Its Reach Exceed Its Due Process Grasp?, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 229,
239-47 (1983) (authored by E. Roy Hawkins) (summarizing Supreme Court doctrine
on personal jurisdiction and surveying relevant cases, including Kulko). Reitmayer
acknowledges these due process problems and has tried to tailor her proposed
long-arm statute to comply with the requirements of Kulko. See Reitmayer, supra
note 47, at 443.
132. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2516 (1989); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 223A,
§ 3(h) (1988); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 104 (Supp. 1990); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.05(a)
(Vernon 1986).
133. The 1988 Child Support Amendments, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343
(1988), call for review of all orders every three years. See 42 U.S.C. 666(a)(10) (1988);
see also Krause, supra note 100, at 377.
134. Some states already calculate child-support awards this way. Under this
system, usually known as the Wisconsin method or the taxation method of calculating
awards, a statute establishes a percentage of the absent parent's net income as the
amount of support owed the child. The support award therefore self-adjusts as the
parent's income changes. See CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 101, at
72-74.
135. See, e.g., DeFeo v. DeFeo, 428 A.2d 26, 27 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1981); Thompson
v. Thompson, 366 N.W.2d 845, 846 (S.D. 1985); Kammersell v. Kammersell, 792 P.2d
496, 496-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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who wants it increased because she perceives that the father
is able to pay more at the current time. 136  States could
preempt most modification problems by changing the manner
in which courts award and calculate child support at the
outset.
The Act's registration procedure also is available to enforce
existing child-support orders.'37 In cases where there is a
valid preexisting order, this procedure could alleviate the
confusion surrounding the necessity of an independent assess-
ment by the responding court. Rather than initiate a new
proceeding in the responding court, the obligee may instead
register the original support order from the divorce court with
the responding court. After the support order is registered,
the court will treat it as if the responding court itself had
entered the order originally. 13  Presumably this means that
the responding court could then modify the order if its
standards for modification were met, for example, by adequate
proof of changed circumstances. 1
39
Because the Act's registration procedure allows for enforce-
ment of existing child-support orders, states should reserve
the civil enforcement procedure for those cases in which there
is no existing enforceable support order, as in interstate
paternity suits. This would ensure that a proper remedy or
enforcement mechanism was available to families in all situa-
tions, while preventing the confusion which arises from
concurrent child-support orders. It also would be more consis-
tent with the Act's role as a supplementary enforcement
remedy, limiting the use of the more complicated and indepen-
dent mechanism for cases in which it is actually necessary. In
conjunction with other available enforcement mechanisms like
those mandated by Title IV-D, this approach would provide an
adequate remedy to obligees.
136. See, e.g., Straek v. Straek, 156 Cal. App. 3d 617, 621, 203 Cal. Rptr. 69, 70
(1984); Koon v. Boulder County, Dep't of Social Servs., 494 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla.
1986).
137. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. The standard for exercising
jurisdiction over the obligor is also lower in registration cases. See, e.g., Gingold v.
Gingold, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1177, 1182, 208 Cal. Rptr. 123, 125 (1984).
138. RURESA § 40(a), 9B U.L.A. 546 (1987).
139. See Schmitt v. Aron, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1086, 1092, 274 Cal. Rptr. 357, 361
(1990).
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The Act should therefore be amended to eliminate the
provision that permits the responding courts to modify
existing child-support orders. Modification of child-support
orders generally requires proof of changed circumstances.
This determination requires assessments that should be made
only when both parties are before the court and all the
relevant factors can be considered. The abbreviated procedure
provided by the Act is an unsuitable method to accomplish this
goal. Attempts to employ it in this manner are a misuse of
the statute. One court recently stated it thus:
[I]t is doubtful that the legislature ever envisioned that
RURESA should place upon the already overburdened
prosecuting attorneys of this state the additional obliga-
tion of litigating the complex questions involved where an
absent obligee seeks an increase in a prior support award
on the basis of changed circumstances. Such cases, if they
are to be adequately litigated and decided, require a
thorough review of the facts and circumstances giving rise
to the initial decree, as well as an extensive investigation
and documentation of the alleged changes in those facts
and circumstances. The sparse records and limited factual
predicates upon which suits are initiated in summary
RURESA proceedings often do not afford the prosecuting
attorney an adequate evidentiary basis from which he or
she can meet the requisite affirmative burden of proof.4 °
The Act plays an important and effective role as a supplemen-
tary enforcement measure. When courts use it to modify prior
orders, however, it simply creates too many other problems to
be valuable as a routine remedy. We need to recognize the
Act's proper function and find other viable means to modify
child-support orders. In so doing, it is important to consider
the context in which the Act evolved and the other enforce-
ment measures that are now available.
It is for these reasons that I propose that the text of the
RURESA antisupersession clause be amended as follows:
140. Taylor v. Vilcheck, 103 Nev. 462, 471, 745 P.2d 702, 708-09 (1987).
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Action under this section is to be taken only when
civil registration is not available as a remedy or is
not feasible or has failed to provide an adequate
remedy. Should action be taken under this section
in a case in which there is an existing child-support
order, a support order made by a court of this State
pursuant to this Act does not nullify and is not
nullified by any other support order entered by a
court in this or any other state. The amount of the
prior order shall presumptively be the proper
amount for any order entered in an action under
this section. Any modification of the amount shall
meet the evidentiary and other standards for modi-
fication of a domestic support order. Amounts paid
for a particular period pursuant to any support
order entered by any court in any state shall be
credited against the amounts accruing or accrued
for the same period under any support order made
by a court of this state.
The changes I suggest are intended to clarify the important
role which the Act can play in the enforcement of child-support
obligations, while eliminating areas of uncertainty which lead
to disagreement. The effect of this amendment is to limit the
use of the civil enforcement mechanism to those cases in
which civil registration is not available as a remedy, primarily
those in which there is no enforceable preexisting support
order. In any case under the civil enforcement mechanism in
which there is a prior order of support, the amount of that
prior order would presumptively be the proper amount for the
responding court's order. Deviation from that amount would
be permitted only if the party requesting modification met the
burden of proof of changed circumstances, which would
generally require more evidence than is available in a typical
RURESA action. This would, however, leave the option of
141. This amendment would replace RURESA § 31, 9B U.L.A. 531 (1987).
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modification open to those who can meet the burden. The
result of this amendment would be to reduce courts' opportuni-
ties to enter concurrent child-support orders and to clarify the
obligations created by the orders of responding courts in
RURESA actions.
